Strategic Delegation in Oligopoly
This chapter provides the reader with a clear and intuitive, but yet rigorous, description of the topic of strategic managerial incentives under oligopolistic competition. A review of the closely related issue of vertical separation where a manufacturer delegates decisions to a retailer and an agent appointment game where a principal delegates decisions to a certain type of agent is also provided. We start the discussion of each of these themes by reflecting on seminal papers that have first introduced the corresponding topic. We present and critically discuss the key assumptions behind each of the basic models and point out important applications along with some empirical and experimental evidence. We also discuss contributions that have provided important extensions to the basic frameworks. Our chapter can be seen as complementary to the extensive literature on agency and control issues.
Kopel, M. und Pezzino, M. (2018): Strategic Delegation in Oligopoly, in: Corchón, L. C. und Marini, M. A. (Hrsg.): Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II: Applications, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, S. 248-285.
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