The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction
Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg et al. (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame. Furthermore, in a well-defined sense, fixed points of this correspondence refine even trembling hand perfect equilibria, while, on the other hand, reasonable equilibria that are not weak perfect Bayesian equilibria are fixed points of this correspondence.
Balkenborg, D., Hofbauer, J. und Kuzmics, C. (2018): The Reﬁned Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction, in: German Economic Review, pp. 1-15, doi: doi.org/10.1111/geer.12136 [24.5.2017].
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