An experimental study on bribes, detection probability and principal witness policy
We present the results of a laboratory bribery experiment in which two bidders compete for a contract and make offers to an employee of a firm which can be accompanied by a bribe. The employee then decides who to award the contract to. The roles of both bidders and the employee are played by subjects in the laboratory. We test whether different probabilities of a bribe being discovered influence the honesty of a contract placing. In a further treatment we investigate the effect of the possibility of cooperating with the authority (principal witness) in combination with a leniency policy in the form of a reduced fine for the all players who cooperate with the authorities. We find that the presence of a leniency policy reduces the number of bribes offered, but at the same time makes the bribes that are offered more profitable for corrupt bidders who earn more, especially under the principal witness condition.
Christöfl, A., Leopold-Wildburger, U. und Rasmußen, A. (2017): An experimental study on bribes, detection probability and principal witness policy, in: Journal of Business Economics, doi: 10.1007/s11573-017-0846-8 [16.01.2017].
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