This paper studies strategic communication in networks, building on classical models of transmission of verifiable information (e.g., Milgrom, 1981). I find that the optimal and pairwise-stable network is a line in which players are ordered according to their bliss points. This stands in sharp contrast with well-known results in network studies, that identify stars as the optimal and pairwise stable networks when communication is non-strategic but subject to technological limitations (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). In fact, stars are the most centralized minimally-connected networks, whereas the line is the most decentralized one. As explained in the paper, my results are especially relevant for political economy applications such as networks of policymakers, interest groups, or judges.
Freitag, 28. Juni 2024, 15:30 Uhr, HS 15.06, RESOWI F-EG
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