Managerial Discretion in Accruals and Informational Efficiency
In this paper, the authors examine the relation between managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency. They find that informational efficiency, measured by the price deviation from a random walk pattern using stock return variance ratios, increases in the extent to which managers exercise discretion over accruals. The results are consistent with the view that discretionary accruals, on average, convey useful information to investors and facilitate the price convergence to its fundamental value. The findings are robust to a battery of tests, including tests to validate both the measures of informational efficiency and the measure of managerial discretion in accruals.
Perotti, P. und Windisch, D. (2017): Managerial Discretion in Accruals and Informational Efficiency, in: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 44, No. 3/4, pp. 375–416, doi: 10.1111/jbfa.12241.
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