A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
We reinvestigate data from the voting experiment of Forsythe et al. (Soc Choice Welf 10:223–247, 1993). In every one of 24 rounds, 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game with or without a preceding opinion poll phase. We find that the null hypothesis that play in every round is given by a particular evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium of the 14-player stage game cannot be rejected if we account for risk aversion (or a heightened concern for coordination), calibrated in another treatment.
Kuzmics, C. und Rodenburger, D. (2020): A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory, in: Economic Theory, Vol. 70, pp. 685-721, doi: doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01224-5.
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