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Vorträge im Sommersemester 2015

29.4.2015Univ.-Prof. Dr. Marc Reimann (Institut für Produktion und Logistik)

Accurate Response with Refurbished Consumer Returns: Optimizing the Return Rate
Es handelt sich um eine gemeinsame Arbeit mit Frau Weihua Zhang, PhD.

In previous work, we extended the existing literature on accurate response by including a new reactive capability, namely the utilization of refurbished consumer returns from early sales to react to demand later in the selling season. The optimal rate of returns is a key question associated with consumer returns. To account for the optimal choice of effort to reduce the return rate we extend our previous accurate response model and show how the optimal effort depends on the disposition possibilities associated with the consumer returns.

 6.5.2015Mag. Herwig Pilaj (Institut für Banken und Finanzierung)

Nachhaltige Geldanlage als Gegenstand interdisziplinärer Forschung: Vier laufende Aktivitäten und sechs Projektideen

Impact Investing, Social Banking, Responsible Finance - Themen am Schnittpunkt von Finanzwirtschaft und Nachhaltigkeit liegen im Trend. Der Forschungsbereich ist prädestiniert für interdisziplinäre Ansätze - nicht zuletzt auch im Hinblick auf die Akquisition von Drittmitteln. Im ersten Teil meines Vortrags präsentiere ich vier laufende Aktivitäten zum Thema. Im zweiten Teil stelle ich ein paar Projektideen zur Diskussion, die unter institutsübergreifender Zusammenarbeit an unserer Universität (Stichwort Forschungsschwerpunkte!) durchaus umsetzbar erscheinen. Gefragt sind dabei unter anderem: Expertise in behavioral sciences, experimental economics, quantitative methods, Nachhaltigkeitsforschung, VWL, Wirtschaftspädagogik, Wirtschaftsethik, Soziologie, Marketing, Verbraucherschutzrecht etc. sowie der Kontakt zu eventuellen Projektpartnern.

13.5.2015Dipl.-Ing. Dr. Joachim Schauer (Institut für Statistik und Operations Research)

Asymptotic Behaviour of the Quadratic Knapsack Problem

We study subclasses of the quadratic knapsack problem, where the profits are independent random variables defined on the interval [0,1] and the knapsack capacity is proportional to the number of items (we assume that the weights are arbitrary numbers from the interval [0,1]). We show asymptotically that the objective value of a very easy heuristic is not far away from the optimal solution. More specifically we show that the ratio of the optimal solution and the objective value of this heuristic almost surely tends to 1 as the size of the knapsack instance tends to infinity. As a consequence using randomly generated instances following this scheme seems to be inappropriate for studying the performance of heuristics and (to some extend) exact methods. However such instances are frequently used in the literature for this purpose. Additionally we introduce a new class of test instances for which finding a good solution is much harder. We support this by theoretical observations as well as by performing computational experiments.

20.5.2015Prof. Dr. Erik Theissen (Universität Mannheim)

The Price Pressure Hypothesis Revisited: Evidence from Tax-Induced Selling
Erik Theissen und Meta Zähres

Do demand or supply shocks which are not accompanied by new information affect prices? If so, is the price effect temporary ("price pressure hypothesis") or permanent ("imperfect substitutes hypothesis")? Numerous empirical studies have dealt with these questions and yet the issue is still unresolved. This paper provides new evidence from Germany. Until 2009 capital gains were taxed when they were realized within a "speculative period" but not when they were realized after the end of that period. Using a sample of more than 200 IPOs that traded above the offer price at the end of the speculative period we find that a) trading volume increases significantly at the end of the speculative period and b) prices decline significantly. There is no indication of a price reversal. This is consistent with the imperfect substitutes hypothesis but inconsistent with the price pressure hypothesis.

27.5.2015ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Ulrich Pferschy (Institut für Statistik und Operations Research)

Fair Allocation of a Bounded Resource to two Agents
Ulrich Pferschy (Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz), Gaia Nicosia (Universita Roma Tre) und Andrea Pacifici (Universita Roma Tor Vergata)

We study the problem of allocating a scarce resource among several players (or agents). A central decision maker wants to maximize the total utility of all the agents. However such solution may be unfair for one or more agents in the sense that it can be achieved through a very unbalanced allocation of resources. On the other hand fair/balanced allocations may be far from being optimal from a central point of view. So, in this paper we are interested in assessing the quality of fair solutions, i.e. in measuring the system efficiency loss under a fair allocation compared to the one that maximizes the sum of agents utilities. This indicator is usually called the Price of Fairness and we analyze under different definitions of fairness from a worst-case point of view.

 3.6.2015Eva Fleiß, MA (Institut für Soziologie)

Money or Morale? A survey study on drivers of investment in citizen participation initiatives in the area of photovoltaics.
Eva Fleiß (Institut für Soziologie, Institut für Systemwissenschaften, Innovations- und Nachhaltigkeitsforschung), Stefanie Hatzl (Institut für Systemwissenschaften, Innovations- und Nachhaltigkeitsforschung) und Sebastian Seebauer (Wegener Center für Klima und Globalen Wandel)

We currently face the challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in order to mitigate climate change. The transition towards renewable energy production is one proposed solution. In this regard, citizen participation initiatives (CPI) in the area of photovoltaics (PV) are a cornerstone to foster the diffusion of renewables and thus promote the transition towards a carbon neutral and adaptive society providing active citizen engagement.

This article investigates people’s motives whether to make a (green?) investment in a PV-CPI using survey data. In addition to commonly used indicators we also inlclude variables that allow us to assess both – people’s desires (‘preferences’, i.e. regarding energy autarky, environmental protection, financial aspects, etc.) and their beliefs in term of how likely their participation in a PV-CPI is to realize these goals. We find that (i) joining a PV-CPI is predominantly driven by people’s beliefs rather than their desires; furthermore, we observe (ii) predominantly financial aspects as important drivers when deciding to join a PV-CPI.

10.6.2015Assoz.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Palan (Institut für Banken und Finanzierung)

Friendliness pays off! Respect and Monetary Gifts in the Service Industry
Michael Kirchler und Stefan Palan

We investigate the role of respect and monetary gifts in the service industry. We report findings from purchases of more than 800 doner durum, a common lunch snack. Prior to the food's preparation, we either give a compliment about the product, or a monetary gift by tipping. We repeat the interaction on five consecutive days. Our findings show that salespersons exhibit positive reciprocity in response both to paying respect and to monetary gifts. Remarkably, the "respect-effect" even gets stronger with repeated purchases.

17.6.2015Vinay Ramani (IIM Udaipur, Indien)

Optimal Privatization and Free Entry
Vinay Ramani und Bibhas Saha

It is well known from Mankiw & Whinston (1986) that with quantity competition and homogenous goods, free entry leads to ''excessive entry'' compared to the social optimum. However, it is not clear whether the result holds in the presence of a substitute good, especially when the substitute good is produced by a public firm. We prove that excessive entry still occurs when there exists an additional effect called variety effect which is outweighed by Mankiw & Whinston's business stealing effect. However, we then show that this excessive entry can be mitigated by the government by using the instrument of privatization, so that the number of firms reaches the socially optimal level and aggregate social welfare is maximized.

 

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Univ.-Prof. Dr.

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Andreas Darmann

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Assoz.-Prof. Dr.

Robert Rybnicek

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